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Abstract—User profiling from user generated content (UGC)
is a common practice that supports the business models of many
social media companies. Existing systems require that the UGC
is fully exposed to the module that constructs the user profiles. In
this paper we show that it is possible to build user profiles without
ever accessing the user’s original data, and without exposing the
trained machine learning models for user profiling – which are
the intellectual property of the company – to the users of the
social media site. We present VirtualIdentity, an application that
uses secure multi-party cryptographic protocols to detect the age,
gender and personality traits of users by classifying their user-
generated text and personal pictures with trained support vector
machine models in a privacy-preserving manner.
Index Terms—User profiling, machine learning, privacy-
preserving, secure multi-party computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As more users are creating their own content on the web,
there is a growing interest to mine this data for use in per-
sonalized information access services, recommender systems,
tailored advertisements, and other applications that can benefit
from personalization [31]. In addition to myriad applications
in e-commerce, there is a growing interest in user profiling
for digital text forensics [40]. Furthermore, the popularity of
applications such as How-Old.net and HowHot.io shows that
users are directly interested in their own personal features
analysis as well [37], [36]. What is common across all of
these existing personalized services is that the personal data
of users, such as their pictures and text, is fully exposed to
the user profiling service.
An obvious way to circumvent this would be to perform the
user profiling entirely on the user’s side. However, this would
imply sharing proprietary, trained machine learning models
for user profiling with each user of the social media site.
Applying traditional cryptography to encrypt the personal data
of the user (henceforth called the client) before sending it
to the user profiling service (the service, or server) is not
a solution either, as data encrypted with usual techniques
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becomes useless, and user characteristics can no longer be
derived from it. Hiding the client’s data from the service,
while still allowing the client to use the service, requires
novel cryptographic techniques that not only protect private
information but also allow mathematical operations to be
performed on encrypted data. To this end, the VirtualIdentity
application that we present in this paper (see Figure 1) relies
on secure multi-party computation, a process in which client
and server jointly compute classification labels by exchanging
encrypted messages, while keeping their own inputs private.
As a result, VirtualIdentity allows a user to run our trained
support vector machines (SVMs) for detection of age, gender,
and personality traits, without leaking any personal text or
profile picture to our server. In addition, the user does not
learn anything about the coefficients of our SVM models.
Other services exist that will predict a user’s age, gender, or
personality based on UGC. For example, users can input their
tweets or text and receive back scores of their personality,
needs, and values [28]. Another site allows users to input
a photo and receive an estimation of the gender and age of
each face in the photo [37] while a third estimates the user’s
attractiveness and age from a photo [36]. However, none of
these services attempt to keep the user’s data private. To the
best of our knowledge, VirtualIdentity is the first platform to
construct user profiles while preserving both the privacy of the
user’s data and the prediction models.
This paper is an extended version of the work that appeared
at the 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances
in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM) [46].
This full version contains the description of the cryptographic
tools that are used.
II. PREDICTIVE MODELS
Much work has been done recently using machine learning
classification to predict age, gender, and personality based on
images and text “in the clear”, i.e. without any attempts for
privacy preservation. In this paper we use SVMs, which are
known as state-of-the-art classification techniques for detecting
age, gender and personality traits from text and images [35],
[24], [9], [25], [26].
A. Age and Gender Classification
For age and gender classification we used the IMDB image
dataset, which is part of the IMDB-WIKI dataset. This set is
formed by 460,723 face images crawled from IMDB websites
with age and gender information [43]. From each image, we
detected face and cropped the margin to 40% using OpenCV
[39]. Then we extracted 136 facial landmark features using
Dlib [34]. These features, which include attributes such as
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2(a) The user inputs text and a profile picture.
(b) For demo purposes, the analysis is done both in the clear
and in a privacy-preserving manner.
(c) The service returns age, gender, and personality analysis.
Fig. 1. Screenshots of VirtualIdentity application.
the exact locations of the eyes, nose, and mouth, were then
used to train the models. Some facial images were dropped
because there is no face or more than one face detected
in them by OpenCV or Dlib’s facial landmark detector. In
addition, images with unreasonable age (e.g.,negative age) and
images without gender information were taken out as well.
After preprocessing and feature extraction, we have 318,562
valid instances remaining in the set. The set is divided into
4 similar-sized age groups: (7-26), (27-34), (35-43), (44-101).
For age classification, each instance will be classified into one
age bucket. For the actual training, we used 6000 of the IMDB
dataset images such that the age and gender distributions of
the selected images are representative of the full set.
We trained a binary SVM classifier for gender classification,
and three binary SVMs for age classification. We use the
results of all three age classifiers to determine the most likely
age bracket. When a new instance comes in, it will first be
classified by Age SVM2 to determine if it is younger than 35
or not. If it is classified into younger than 35-year-old group, it
will then be scored against Age SVM1 to see if it is younger
than 27. Otherwise, Age SVM3 will be applied to check if
the new instance is older than 43. This approach is similar
to the approach of Han et al. [26]. While they use additional
models to then predict an actual age inside the bracket, we
return the result determined from the three original SVMs.
Table 1 depicts the baseline values compared with the
average accuracies of the gender SVM and three age SVMs
using 10-fold cross-validation.
B. Personality Traits Detection
For personality we report scores using the traits of the
widely accepted model, the Big Five, consisting of the fol-
lowing five results: openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism [14]. Our goal is
to create classifiers to predict if one user displays those 5
characteristics. The dataset we used for personality traits de-
tection is a dataset with 2467 essays (one empty instance was
removed from the original 2468) from psychology students
who were told to write whatever came to their mind for 20
minutes [35]. Each essay was analysed and given Big Five
personality ground truth labels by Pennebaker et al. [42].
We extracted three kinds of features from the essays as input
for the classifiers: 14 MRC features, 10 NRC features, and 19
LIWC features (43 features in total).
MRC is a psycholinguistic database which contains psycho-
logical and distributional information about words such as the
number of letters in the word, the concreteness, and the age of
acquisition [12].We used the same 14 MRC features as Farnadi
et al. [25] The features are: number of letters in the word
(NLET), number of phonemes in the word (NPHON), number
of syllables in the word (NSYL), Kucera and Francis written
frequency (KF FREQ), Kucera and Francis number of cate-
gories (KF NCATS), Kucera and Francis number of samples
(KF NSAMP), Thorndike-Lorge frquency (TL FREQ), Brown
verbal frequency (BROWN FREQ), Familiarity (FAM), con-
creteness (CONC), imagery (IMAG), mean Colerado Mean-
ingfulness (MEANC), mean Pavio Meaningfulness (MEANP),
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and age of acquisition (AOA). Each feature is computed by
averaging the feature value of all the words in the essay. [25]
NRC is a lexicon that contains more than 14,000 distinct
English words annotated with 8 emotions (anger, fear, anticipa-
tion, trust, surprise, sadness, joy, and disgust), and 2 sentiments
(negative, positive)[38]. For each document we counted the
number of words in each of the 8 emotion and 2 sentiment
categories, resulting in 10 features per document.
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count tool (LIWC) is a
well-known text analysis software which is widely used in
psychology studies [44]. Part of the LIWC features rely on
a proprietary dictionary. Our SVM models are trained on 19
LIWC features that relate to standard counts and that do not
require the specific LIWC dictionary: word count, words per
sentence, number of unique words, number of words longer
than six letters, number of abbreviations, emoticons, question
marks, periods, commas, colons, semi-colons, exclamation
marks, dashes, quotation marks, apostrophes, parentheses,
other punctuation marks, all punctuation marks, and number
of interrogative sentences.
Since more than one trait can be present in the same user,
we used the 43 features to trained one binary SVM classifier
for each of the five traits, which separates the users displaying
the characteristic from those who do not. Table 2 depicts the
baseline values compared with the average accuracies of our
5 SVMs using 10-fold cross-validation.
All SVMs in our model bank were trained using scikit-learn
in Python, with a linear kernel and penalty parameter C = 1.
The trained SVMs are part of a private machine learning
model bank that resides on the server, as shown on the right
side in Figure 2. When a user requests analysis of a snippet of
text and a picture, the features described above are extracted
from the text and the image on the client side, as shown
on the left side in Figure 2. Neither the user’s text, nor the
user’s image, nor any of the extracted features are leaked to
the server. Instead, both the client and the server engage in
cryptographic protocols and exchange encrypted messages that
ultimately allow the server to classify the feature vectors of
the client, without ever seeing them in the clear, as we explain
in Section III.
III. ADDING PRIVACY TO OUR CLASSIFIERS
Only a limited amount of work has been done in crypto-
graphically secure privacy-preserving machine learning classi-
fication and none of it is aimed specifically at user profiling.
Cryptographically secure privacy-preserving SVM classifi-
cation protocols have been proposed in [33], [5], [16], [10].
The basic idea behind these protocols is to decompose the task
of scoring an SVM into smaller tasks and to implement each
one of them in a privacy-preserving way. To better understand
these previous approaches we recall that for the case of two
classes, the process for SVM classification in the clear is as
follows [13]: the client holds an n-dimensional input feature
vector x, and the server holds a trained model that consists
of a n-dimensional vector of weights a and a real number b
learned from the training data. The result of the classification
is obtained by computing
sign (〈x,a〉 − b) ,
where the function sign (y) gives + if y > 0 and − otherwise.
For instance, in the case of personality prediction, x is a 43-
dimensional vector with features extracted from the client’s
text and (a, b) are the weights and the bias that make up the
trained SVM model for e.g. “neuroticism”. A classification
outcome + means that the user is neurotic, and an outcome
of − means that he is not. Therefore, to score SVMs privately,
one needs to build privacy-preserving for two tasks: computing
inner products and performing comparisons.
In [33], private inner products and comparisons are obtained
by using additive homomorphic encryption and oblivious
transfer, while in [5] the proposed protocols are based on
Paillier encryption - a specific kind of additive homomorphic
encryption scheme. These operations are usually expensive
from a computational complexity point of view, demanding
costly modular exponentiations. In [16], [10], highly effi-
cient protocols for privacy-preserving comparison and argmax
in the commodity-based model [4] were proposed. In the
commodity-based model correlated data is pre-distributed to
the parties by a trusted initializer during an off-line setup
phase. Here we use the comparison protocol of [10] combined
with a generalization for matrices of Beaver’s multiplication
protocol [2] in order to obtain the first implementation of a
practical system for solving the problem of privacy-preserving
user profiling.
We have already mentioned how we perform the private
classification of personality traits. Now, we briefly describe
how we proceed to obtain age and gender prediction. For age
prediction, we first split the age groups into 4 classes, such
that the frequency of each class is equal. Because there are 4
classes, there will be 3 splitting points. Our target functionality
is the one that first determine if the instance is in the lower
or upper half by using the binary SVM that is the middle,
and then use one binary SVM more in the remaining half to
determine the exact class. In the protocol, instead of running
the SVMs sequentially, we run all the three independent SVMs
in parallel up to the point right before the opening of the
results. We then open the result of the SVM in the middle,
and after that we open the result of the SVM that is relevant
for the chosen half in order to determine the class. A separate
SVM is evaluated in a privacy-preserving way to determine
4TABLE II
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Fig. 2. System overview of the VirtualIdentity application.
the gender of the user. It should be noted, that the techniques
used here for implementing privacy-preserving inner product
and comparison protocols only work for integer values. To
account for this, real values must be converted into integers
and lose some of the precision allowable by floating notation.
In this work we consider honest-but-curious adversaries
(i.e., adversaries that follow the protocol instructions but try
to learn additional information), as done in the other works
on privacy-preserving classification.
A. Computing with Secret Sharing
We use the paradigm of secure computation based on secret
sharings. For each shared value, Alice and Bob hold uniformly
random values (i.e., the shares) constrained to the condition
that they sum up to the actual value that is shared. The
computation is then done over the shares, and when it is
finished Alice and Bob exchange their shares of the output
in order to recover it. In more details, if the shares are in
a ring Zq and the shared value is x ∈ Zq , Alice and Bob
hold uniformly random xA, xB ∈ Zq , respectively, subject
to the constraint that xA + xB = x mod q. Our notation
for secret sharings will follow the one used in [10]. LetJxK
q
denote the secret sharing (xA, xB). Given secret sharingsJxK
q
, JyK
q
, performing additions and subtractions of the shared
values, and adding a/multiplying by a constant are very simple
operations that can be performed locally by Alice and Bob by
just performing the respective operations in their local shares.
These local operations will be denoted by JzK
q
← JxK
q
+JyK
q
,JzK
q
← JxK
q
− JyK
q
, JzK
q
← cJxK
q
and JzK
q
← JxK
q
+ c.
The notation is extend straightforwardly to element-wise secret
sharing of vectors JxK
q
and matrices JXK
q
; and similarly for
the operations.
B. Commodity-based Cryptography
Our solution works in the commodity-based model [4], [3] –
a setup assumption in which a trusted initializer pre-distributes
correlated randomness to Alice and Bob during an initial
setup phase. This pre-distributed data is independent from the
protocol inputs, which can even be fixed far after. We should
also emphasize that the trusted initializer does not participate
anymore after given the pre-distributed correlated randomness
to Alice and Bob. The commodity-based model allows the
5Functionality FDTI
FDTI runs with Alice and Bob and is parametrized by an
algorithm D. Upon initialization run (DA, DB) $← D.
Deliver DA to Alice and DB to Bob.
Fig. 3. The Trusted Initializer functionality.
design of practical, unconditionally secure protocols for many
interesting functionalities, for example: inner product [19],
linear algebra [15], oblivious transfer [4], oblivious polynomial
evaluation [45], verifiable secret sharing [23], set intersec-
tion [29] and string equality [29]. Given its usefulness it was
also already used for obtaining privacy-preserving machine
learning protocols [16], [11], [10]. In this work the trusted
initializer is modeled by an ideal functionality FDTI , which is
parametrized by an algorithm D that samples the correlated
data to be pre-distributed to Alice and Bob. See Figure 3 for
details.
Another advantage of the commodity-based model is that it
is one of the setup assumptions allowing to obtain UC-security
[6], which is the notion of security allowing the modular
design of protocols while keeping the security guarantees (as
done in our privacy-preserving protocols). 1
C. Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplication
While Section III-A described many operations that can
be performed locally by Alice and Bob, the most important
operation that is missing and that requires interaction between
them is the multiplication of shared values. This can be an
expensive operation in general, but in the commodity-based
model there is a very elegant and simple solution by Beaver
[2]. As we will also need secure (distributed) inner product as
a building block, we describe here a generalization of Beaver’s
idea that performs secure distributed matrix multiplication (and
so covers both cases of interest) following the description used
in [10]. Alice and Bob hold secret sharings JXK
q
and JY K
q
of matrices X ∈ Zi×jq and Y ∈ Zj×kq and they want to obtain
a secret sharing corresponding to the matrices’ product. The
approach is to have the trusted initializer pre-distributing a
random matrix multiplication triple to Alice and Bob, i.e.,
secret sharings JUK
q
, JV K
q
and JW K
q
with U and V uniformly
random in Zi×jq and Zj×kq , respectively, and W = UV . This
matrix multiplication triple is then easily derandomize by
Alice and Bob in order to match the actual inputs. The protocol
piDMM is described in Figure 4. The protocol correctness
can be easily checked using the fact that W = UV . The
protocol security essentially comes from the fact that in the
revealed values, D and E, the inputs X and Y are masked
1It is impossible to obtain non-trivial UC-secure two-party computation
without setup assumptions [7], [8]. Some other setup assumptions are also
known to allow non-trivial two-party computation, such as: the existence of
a common reference string [7], [8], [41], of noisy channels [21], [20], of a
public public-key infrastructure [1], of signature cards [27] or of tamper-proof
hardware [30], [17], [22].
Secure Matrix Multiplication Protocol piDMM
The protocol is parametrized by the size q of the ring and the
dimensions i, j and k of the matrices, and runs with Alice
and Bob. The trusted initializer chooses uniformly random
U and V in Zi×jq and Zj×kq , respectively, computes W =
UV and pre-distributes secret sharings JUKq , JV Kq , JW Kq to
Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob have inputs JXKq , JY Kq and
interact as follows:
1) Locally compute JDKq ← JXKq − JUKq and JEKq ←JY Kq − JV Kq , then open D and E.
2) Locally compute JZK
q
← JW K
q
+EJUK
q
+DJV K
q
+
DE.
Fig. 4. The protocol for secure distributed matrix multiplication [10]..
by completely random one-time pads U and V , respectively
(and the one-time pads are only used once). A more detailed
security proof can be found in [10], [18]:
Lemma 3.1: The protocol piDMM UC-realizes the distributed
matrix multiplication functionality against honest-but-curious
adversaries in the commodity-based model.
Notation: We denote by piDM the protocol for the special
case of multiplication of single elements. The special case of
inner product computation will be denoted as piIP.
D. Secure Distributed Comparison
We also use as a building block the secure distributed
comparison protocol of [10]. Alice and Bob want to compare
two `-bit integers, x = x` . . . x1 and y = y` . . . y1. Alice and
Bob have as input secret sharings JxiK2 and JyiK2 of each
bit of x and y. The output of the distributed comparison isJ1K
2
if x ≥ y and J0K
2
if x < y. No additional information
should be leaked to Alice or Bob. The (basic) comparison
protocol piDC is described in Figure 5. The security of piDC
was proved in [10]. The intuition is that the only non-local
operations are the multiplications, so the security of the
distributed comparison protocol follows from the security of
the distributed multiplication protocol.
Lemma 3.2 ([10]): The distributed comparison protocol
piDC UC-realizes the distributed comparison functionality
against honest-but-curious adversaries in the commodity-based
model.
We use the optimized version of the protocol (described in
[10]), which only has 2 + log ` rounds.
E. Secure Bit-Decomposition
For obtaining the privacy-preserving SVMs, the secure
inner product piIP and the secure distributed comparison piDC
protocols need to be integrated; however, the inner product
will be used with inputs over large rings, while the comparison
protocol works on the binary field. Therefore it is necessary
to have a protocol for converting secret sharings in the big
field JxK
q
to bit-wise secret-sharings JxiK2 in the binary field
6Secure Distributed Comparison Protocol piDC
Let ` be the bit length of the integers to be compared. The
trusted initializer pre-distributes the correlated randomness
necessary for the execution of all instances of the distributed
multiplication protocol. Alice and Bob have as inputs sharesJxiK2 and JyiK2 of each bit of x and y. The protocol proceeds
as follows:
1) For i = 1, . . . , `, compute in parallel JdiK2 ←JyiK2 (1− JxiK2) using the multiplication protocol
piDM and locally compute JeiK2 ← JxiK2 + JyiK2 + 1.
2) For i = 1, . . . , `, compute JciK2 ← JdiK2∏`j=i+1JejK2
using the multiplication protocol piDM.
3) Compute JwK
2
← 1 +∑`i=1JciK2 locally.
Fig. 5. The protocol for secure distributed comparison [10].
Secure Bit-Decomposition Protocol piDecomp
Let ` be the bit length of the value x to be re-shared. All
distributed multiplications using protocol piDM will be over
Z2 and the required correlated randomness is pre-distributed
by the trusted initializer. Alice and Bob have as input JxKq
for q = 2` and proceed as follows:
1) Let a denote Alice’s share of x, which corresponds
to the bit string a` . . . a1. Similarly, let b denote Bob’s
share of x, which corresponds to the bit string b` . . . b1.
Define the secret sharings JyiK2 as the pair of shares
(ai, bi) for yi = ai + bi mod 2, JaiK2 as (ai, 0) andJbiK2 as (0, bi).
2) Compute Jc1K2 ← Ja1K2Jb1K2 using piDM and locally
set Jx1K2 ← Jy1K2 .
3) For i = 2, . . . , `:
a) Compute JdiK2 ← JaiK2JbiK2 + 1
b) JeiK2 ← JyiK2Jci−1K2 + 1
c) JciK2 ← JeiK2JdiK2 + 1
d) JxiK2 ← JyiK2 + Jci−1K2
4) Output JxiK2 for i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
Fig. 6. The secure bit-decomposition protocol [10].
(for x = x` · · ·x1). This work uses the same specialized bit-
decomposition protocol as in [10] (which is similar to the
one of Laud and Randmets [32]). It works for q = 2` and
the main idea is use a carry computation to obtain the bitwise
secret sharings JxiK2 starting from the shares of JxKq that Alice
and Bob have. The (basic version of the) bit-decomposition
protocol piDecomp is presented in Figure 6. The security of
piDecomp follows intuitively from the fact that the only non-
local operations are the distributed multiplications, and these
are performed using a UC-secure protocol.
Lemma 3.3 ([10]): Over any ring Z2` , the bit-
decomposition protocol piDecomp UC-realizes the bit-
decomposition functionality in the commodity-based model.
Optimization: This work use the round-optimized version
of piDecomp, which has 2+dlog `e rounds and uses 2`dlog `e+3`
instances of the multiplication protocol piDM over Z2. Details
available in [10].
F. Privacy-Preserving SVMs
As the mentioned before, for a SVM, given the feature
vector x and the trained model (a, b) that consists of a vector
of weights a and a real number b, the result of the classification
is given by
sign (〈x,a〉 − b) .
The idea for obtaining a privacy-preserving SVM protocol
is as follows: (1) Alice inputs her feature vector x and Bob
inputs the weight vector a to the secure inner product protocol
piIP; (2) the resulting secret sharing in Zq is then processed
by the bit-decomposition protocol piDecomp to obtain bitwise
secret sharings in Z2; (3) then the bitwise secret sharings can
be used in the comparison protocol piDC to check whether it
is greater than b or not. The final result is then revealed to
Alice.
The security of this protocol follows straightforwardly from
the fact that the building blocks are UC-secure (i.e., they can
be arbitrarily composed without the security being compro-
missed) and the fact that no values are ever opened before the
final result. In other words, other than the output, each party
only sees shares which appear completely random to them.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The overall architecture of our demo is shown in Figure 2.
The framework consists of a client Java application, a server,
and the cryptographic protocols embedded in client and server.
Next, we describe these modules.
A. Client Application
The user interface of our client application shown in
Figure 1 is developed with JavaFX. The client application
consists of a feature extractor and its respective portion of
the cryptographic protocols. It allows users to upload user
generated content (i.e. to input written text and to upload a
personal picture). It extracts features from the UGC, executes
cryptographic protocols with the server, and interprets and
displays the final prediction results from the machine learning
models. The interpretation of personality refers to Personality
Insights [28].
B. Server
The server contains its respective portion of the crypto-
graphic protocols and the private machine learning model
bank. The model bank contains the SVMs which are used
for predicting personality traits, age and gender.
7C. Cryptographic Protocols
The cryptographic protocols (privacy-preserving protocols
for computing inner products and comparisons), are executed
in both the client and server side. The trusted initializer
pre-distributes correlated data to the client and the server
as specified in the commodity-based model during an off-
line phase [16], [4]. The communication between client and
server is implemented using sockets. The whole VirtualIdentity
application is programmed with Java under JDK 1.8.
D. System Performance
We have implemented VirtualIdentity within a server of the
University of Washington. The client was hosted in a local
computer in the city of Tacoma, outside of the university?s
network. In average, the running time (including computing
and communication delays) was about 5 seconds for the
solution in the clear. The privacy preserving solution was
evaluated in about 14s-16s. The privacy preserving solution
was about 3 times slower than the solution in the clear.
We believe our solution is practical, particularly in the
trusted initializer model, where correlated randomness is dis-
tributed to the parties in a setup phase.
V. CONCLUSION
Many data-driven personalized services require that private
data of users – such as user generated content, personal pref-
erences, browsing behavior, or medical lab results – is scored
with proprietary, trained machine learning models. The current
widespread practice expects users to give up their privacy by
sending their data in the clear to the server where the machine
learning models reside. In this paper we have demonstrated
that the use of secure multi-party computation techniques
allows the construction of user profiles from user generated
content while preserving both the privacy of the user’s data
and the prediction models. The overall architecture of the
VirtualIdentity application is generic and can be extended to
other applications; this would involve extraction of different
features and training new models for the private machine
learning model bank.
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